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The enormous volatility in the prices of capital assets in the
American economy has been widely noted. The standard deviation of real
stock market returns appears to be about 20 percent per year. Over the
last 15 years the price of used capital goods as measured in the stock
market relative to consumption goods has varied by a factor of more than
two. Comparable volatility is observed in the pricing of used capital
goods such as airplanes and office building where an active second—hand
market exists. It seems clear that realistic positive or normative analysis
of the effects of capital income taxation requires models in which there Is
substantial scope for variation in the price of capital assets. Yet, the
substantial literature on capital income taxes and risk taking has focused
almost entirely on models where the return from capital goods is variable
but their relative price is certain.
This paper reconsiders the effects of taxes on the return from
risky assets, recognizing the importance of variations in the price of
capital goods. The results suggest that the burden of the corporate income
tax is much greater than that implied by analyses such as Gordon (1981),
Stiglitz (1969) and Feldstein (1971), suggesting that it falls primarily
on the risk premium on corporate equity. The essential error in earlier
analyses is in the treatment of depreciation. The observations that capital
asset prices are far more volatile than earnings streams suggests that most
of the risk associated with capital assets is in their rate of economic
(though perhaps not physical) depreciation rather than in their contemporaneous
marginal product. The tax laws' use of ex ante depreciation schedules rather
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than ex post depreciation means that depreciation or "capital" risk
is not shared by the tax collector. Therefore, a tax like the U.S.
corporate income tax absorbs a much greater part of the return than of
the risk on capital investments.
The implications of capital risk for depreciation policy are then
considered. We argue that traditional concepts of what constitutes economic
depreciation are likely to lead to serious errors in realistic settings.
In particular, the notion which pervades theoretical and empirical work
on depreciation policy, that economic depreciation can be measured by the
expected decline in the price of capital assets, is shown to be wrong. We
derive a new measure of economic durability which can be calculated from
observable market data on asset rentals and prices, and use it as a bench-
mark for evaluating current tax policies.
The implications of using this new measure of economic durability
for a number of tax policy questions is analyzed. Using two alternative
empirical methods based on financial market data, we show that prior calcu-
lations of appropriate economic depreciation represent serious underestimates
because of their failure to consider risk. We also show that proper risk
accounting suggests that previous calculations of effective tax rates are
very misleading, and that their implications for the problem of neutrality
between assets of different durability are not valid. A final implication
of the results is that true rates of economic depreciaton have increased
very substantially over the last decade due to increasing uncertainty.
The first section of this paper examines the effects of capital
income taxes on investment within standard models where the price of capital
goods is known with certainty. A number of serious logical, and empirical
problems which arise in applying this analysis to actual corporate income taxes3
are then pointed out. The crucial distinction between accounting income
on which the corporate tax is levied, and real economic income which
includes capital gains and losses is emphasized. The second section shows
that these difficulties can be avoided by recognizing the distinction
between income and capital risk. The observation that most risk is of
the latter variety leads to a reconsideration of tax depreciationpolicy.
In the third Section our new economic durability measure is introduced,
and the concept of economic depreciation in a risky environment isanalyzed.
The implications of the analysis for the evaluation of taxpolicy are taken
up in the fourth section. Empirical estimates based on financial market
data, suggesting the importance of taking account of asset price risk in
estimating rates of economic depreciation are also presented. A fifth
section of the paper summarizes the results and suggests direction for
subsequent theoretical and empirical research.4
I. Taxes and RiskTaking When Depreciation
isKnownwithCertainty
This section reviews previous results regarding the effects of
taxation on investment in risky assets. We show that the seemingly
paradoxical conclusion of much of this literature, that taxes on risky
assets actually encourage investment in them, is a consequence of the
fact that the claim taken by the government has a negligible or negative
market value. We then assess the relevance of standard models for the
problem of evaluating the effects of the U.S. corporate income tax.
The models are found wanting because of their failure to take account of
changes In the relative price of capital goods.
We begin by considering a simple model of corporate investment
in a mean variance setting similar to the one employed in earlier work
on taxation and risk taking. While the model has only one period,
Hamilton's (1981) analysis suggests that results very similar to those
reported here could be obtained in the context of a continuous time
intertemporal capital asset pricing model. While the expected return from
risky assets is uncertain, we assume that their terminal price is known
withcertainty. This assumption (which we relax below) although implicit,
plays a crucial role in the analyses of the effects of taxes on risky
assets presented in Stiglitz (1969), Feldstein (1971) and Gordon (1981)
amongothers.For simplicity, we initially ignore inflation and personal
taxes.
We assume that the perfect capital market assumptions necessary
for the validity of the Capital Asset Pricing Model1 are valid. In this
case, individuals are compensated for only the systematic risk which they5
bear. Diversifiable risk is not compensated so that private and social
risk are equal. This implies that there is no gain from risk spreading
through government taxation of risky assets. The private capital market
is able to accomplish all feasible risk sharing.2 In the context of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model in the absence of taxes, the corporate sector
will invest up to the point where:
(1.1)
where ft(K)e is the expected marginal product of capital, assumed to be
a declining function of K,tS is the rate of geometric decay of capital
goods,3 r is the real interest rate, and a is the risk premium on corporate
cov(f'(K), r ) —
sectorinvestments. In the context of the CAPM, a
var(r
•r
where r is the excess rate of return on the market portfolio, and is
its expected value. Note that because of the assumption of a constant
relative price of capital, no term reflecting capital gains or losses appears
in (1.1). This assumption is relaxed below.
Now introduce a corporate income tax at rate T with full loss offsets
which allows depreciation deductions of 5K each period.4 Such a tax reduces
both the expected return and standard deviation of returns on corporate
investment by lOOT percent.
Tobin (1958) effectively considers the case where government spending
is invariant to corporate tax collections, individuals consider government
debt part of net wealth, and the rate of return on the riskless asset is
zero. In this case risky investment rises to times the level it was
before the tax, so that each investor has the same expected return and standard
deviation as before. The lOOT percent of the systematic risk on corporate
investment is effectively eliminated from the economy by the government's6
ability (by issuing government bonds when tax collections are low and
repurchasing the bonds when collections are high) to create new wealth
to offset any risk in tax collections.
Stiglitz (1969) and Feldstein (1971) continue along the same vein
with models where the government is able to eliminate from the economy
any risk in tax collections. They consider the case where the riskless
rate exceeds zero. In their models, if a tax were levied strictly on the
risk premium (ct, or the actual return less riskless rate) the Tobin result
of risky investment rising to of previous levels is attained. However,
if the tax is on the entire return to the risky asset the effect on risky
investment is ambiguous: If the risky asset earns the riskless rate
pre—tax it yields its owner a lower after—tax return than the riskiess
asset. This extra tax deters risky investment while the tax on the risk
premium encourages it.
Gordon (1981) in his provocative analysis of the effects of the
corporate income tax assumes that all revenue risk is ultimately borne by
the private sector. In the Gordon model a tax on the risk premium is
non—distort ionary: unlike the earlier models, risky investment is unchanged
because after the tax is imposed in aggregate investors are still bearing
as much risk as they wanted to before the tax.
If there is a taxonthe entire return the corporate income tax
reduces corporate capital accumulation. For example, in the case where
investor preferences were such that they demanded the same after—tax
capital market line (i.e. risk/return possibilities) as before the tax then
corporate investment would take place up to a point where:
(1.2) (1_T)(f(K)e_ )= r+ a(1-T)
Gordon points out that the change in the marginal product of corporate
capital caused by the imposition of the corporate tax is equal to:7
(1.3)tf'(K) =r.
Given the very low level of real interest rates available in the
American economy, this expression seems to imply that the corporate income
tax has only a negligible impact on corporate investment.Assuming a
two percent real interest rate and a Cobb—Douglas productionfunction,
this expression implies that the corporate income tax reduces thesize
of the capital stock by only about 13 percent.5 This lowestimate is
obtained without considering the effects of accelerateddepreciation,
the investment tax credit, the tax advantages of debtfinance, or the
government's ability to spread risk. Introduction of these factors as
in Gordon and Fullerton (1981) could even lead to the conclusionthat
the corporate income tax encouragescorporate capital investment. One
paradoxical result that arises in this formulation is that thecorporate
tax encourages investment despite the fact that It raisesa significant
amount of revenue. The expected revenue yield from thecorporate tax is
rK(r+ )whichmay be quite large. Plausible American magnitudessuggest
that expected annual tax revenues wouldrepresent about five percent of the
market value of capital stock.
Gordon's provocative paper has several other striking implications.
It seems to imply that the corporate tax is very desirable, having little
effect on behavior but raising significant revenue. Equation (1.3) would
also seem to imply that changes in the tax treatment of the non—corporate
sector would have only small effects on the level of corporate investment,
unless the real after—tax interest rate was substantially altered.
Likewise, the results suggest that differences in the corporate tax rate
between sectors are unlikely to have important allocative effects.
These results seem violently counterintuitive. How can a tax
which raises significant revenue encourage the activity which is being8
taxed? One way to examine this question is to look at the value of the
government's claim on the private sector. It is useful to begin with the
case where r —0,and the corporate tax is totally non—distortionary.
In this case, the government's claim has a zero value. Any individual
investor can replicate it costlessly by borrowing and holding the risky
asset. The government's tax revenues are fair compensation for the
risk that it takes on, but no more. When an individual receives an
endowment of part of government revenues, it makes him no wealthier or
poorer, since he can costlessly restore his original risk—return
position. There is no free lunch here. The non—distortionary character
of the tax is a concomitant of its zero market value.
What about the case where the government is able to reduce risk?
In this case, as Tobin (1958) and Stiglitz (1969) noted, the corporate
tax tends to encourage corporate investment. Unless bonds are net wealth,
this situation can only arise if private capital markets are imperfect
and so unable to fully diversify risk. By providing a valuabe diversification
service the government is able to increase the slope of the capital market
line faced by investors, even though expected revenues are positive. The
net effect can be an increase in risky investments. In this case, the
government is providing to taxpayers a form of insurance which is not
provided by the private sector.
These results need to be modified slightly in the case where r
Is positive. The results just stated would then be valid for a tax which
had its base the excess return (f'(K) —6—r)on corporate capital.
As Mintz (1981) and others have observed, a tax on an asset's risk premium
has zero market value and no incentive effects.6 A standard corporate
income tax would then have an effect insofar as it fell on the certain
component of the return to corporate investment. The market value of the9
government's claim (for a given year) is .Inthis case where the
government's claim is positive, it does have some negative effect on
corporate investment. -
Introducinginflation and personal taxes would not have any
substantial effect in the preceding conclusions. The corporate tax
in the foregoing analysis can be treated as an integrated tax including
the effects of dividend and capital gains taxes. Introducing inflation
would alter the conclusions slightly because of the taxation of nominal
as well as real capital gains and interest., However, Cordon's analysis
which includes both inflation and personal taxes reaches conclusions similar
to those obtained here. The introduction of risk into the models which
are normally used in public finance appears to have the dramatic implica-
tion that a corporate income tax has only very small allocative effects.
In the next section we show that this is a consequence of standard models'
failure to account for fluctuations in the relative price of capital goods.
II. Fluctuations in the Price of Capital Goods
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that there are no free
lunches in corporate taxation. Only taxes which extract a claim of zero
value fail to discourage the taxed activity. In this section we examine
the applicability of analyses of the type reviewed in the previous section
to the U.S. corporate income tax. We conclude that they are net applicable
because the vast majority of the risk borne by corporate investors involves
capital gains and losses as the relative price of corporate capital goods
changes. The corporate income tax is levied on accounting income which
excludes these capital gains and losses. Hence it does not share in this
type of risk.10
The implausibility of the standard framework's interpretation
of the corporate income tax is easily exhibited. If corporate capital
requires a significant risk premium, it follows that there must be a
sizable risk that the return from holding corporate capital is less
than the risk free rate. Otherwise, this asset would dominate the
safe asset. The earnings—price ratio measures the rate of return
investors would receive if the relative price of capital goods remained
constant as assumed in previous analysis of the effects of taxation on
risk taking. The lowest value of the earnings price ratio observed
since 1948 was 4.62 percent, far in excess of any estimate of the riskless
rate.7 An alternative way to view the problem is in terms of the after—tax
net marginal product of capital. Holland and Myers (1979) report that the
lowest value of this statistic was 3.6 percent in 1974. Many studies
have estimated the pre—tax marginal product of capital, and have found
that it consistently lies above eight percent. These figures imply that
if the relative price of capital goods were fixed, corporate investments
would dominate acquisitions of the safe asset. In order to make the same
point in yet another way, note that the real interest rate has averaged
close to zero. Yet, corporate tax collections have always been significantly
positive, implying that the tax base has always been significant and positive.
It seems clear that any effort to model taxes taking effect of risks borne
by investors .cannot tell a consistent story if the fiction that the relative
price of capital remains constant ismaintained.8
The importance of changes in the relative price of capital goods
may be seen directly in a rkumber of ways. At the aggregate level, the q
ratio of the market value of the corporate capital stock to an estimate of11
its "replacement cost" has varied between .56 and 1.24 over the past
20 years. This measure involves the ambiguous concept of the replacement
cost of capital. An alternative approach is through an examination of
the variance in stock market returns. Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1979)
report that the standard deviation of annual stock market returns is about
20percent. The standard deviation of the earnings price ratio is
less than three percent, and the standard deviation of the marginal product
of capital was less than two percent. This implies that variations in the
earnings price ratio accounts for between one and 17 percent of the variation
in stock market returns.9 It seems fair to conclude that most of the risk
borne by corporate investors is capital risk, involving changes in the price
of their asset rather than income risk, involving changes in the current
return on assets.
The enormous volatility in the relative price of capital shows up clearly
in the markets for used capital goods. Table 1 presents some information
on the variability in depreciation rates, as inf erred from used car and
truck prices. The data are drawn from published guides to used asset prices,
and so undoubtedly understate the volatility of actual transactions prices.
Since they reflect nationwide averages, they also understate the extent of
uncertainty about the rate of decline in the price of any individual capital
good. Nonetheless, the data exhibit very significant year—to—year variations
in the rate of real price change. For example, the annual rate of real
price decline for two year—old Ford F600 trucks varied between 25.8 percent
in 1971 and 7.8 percent in 1976. Overall, for most models and vintages of
cars and trucks, the standard deviation of annual rates of real price decline
was between five and ten percent. It is reasonable to expect that because12
TABLE 1
STANDARDDEVIATIONS OFDEPRECIATION RATES
Asset
Age
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cars
Pinto 8.810.76.35.2
Malibu 3.9 5.310.212.7
Impala 3.1 3.7 .6.914.1
Trucks
Ford F600 6.96.5 6.55.99.66.06.25.1
Ford C8000 1.23.2 5.65.65.97.211.30.9
International
Harvester 1600
6.75.8 6.46.57.67.814.513.3
Chevrolet CE61003 7.85.2 6.05.86.86.610.511.5
Dodge D600 6.25.6 6.44.85.76.67.313.1
Note: Data on cars were kindly provided by James Kahn. Data on trucks were
provided by Dean Amel. All numbers in the table are percentages at annual
rates. Data on cars were for 1972—77 models. Data on trucks were for 1971—78
models, with the prices of the various models tracked through 1980.13
of their short lifetimes and easy reproducibility, used car and truck
prices should be much less volatile than those of other capital assets.
While data are not available on the rents earned by owners of
cars and trucks, it seems fair to conclude that most of the risk borne
by holders of these assets is capital risk involving changes in the price
rates than income risk involving changes in the current return. These
data corroborate the inference drawn from aggregate data that most of
the risk borne by corporate investors involves changes in the relative
price of corporate capital, rather than movements in the marginal
productivity of capital.
Income Risk vs. Capital Risk
It will be useful in what follows to distinguish carefully between
income risk and capital risk. An investor demands a premium for holding
a risky asset both because the value of the rental services produced this
period are risky and because the asset's value at the end of the current
period is uncertain. More formally, the holding return on an asset is
f p
given by+ —.Incomerisk refers to the uncertainty in the first K K
term while capital risk refers to uncertainty in the second term.
Assets with pure "income risk" would yield uncertain profits in
the current period but have a predetermined end—of—period market value.
For example, consider an asset that was always supplied perfectly
elastically at a price of p and exhibited no physical depreciation.
In equilibrium the asset would be supplied to the point where the expected
return would equal the riskiess rate plus any premium necessary to allow
for the fact that the current period's income was risky. The asset's
terminal value, will be p for certain, and therefore in a futures market
the owner could contract to sell the asset at the end of the period for
its expected terminal value of p* with no premium necessary for any
risk in the capital value.14
A second type of asset may yield a current income that is predictable
with virtual certainty, but the asset's end—of—period value (the present
value of subsequent income) will fluctuate substantially. For example,
an investor who buys a long—term bond knows that at the end of the current
period he will receive a certain amount of income, but the capital value
of his bond may change dramatically because of changes in the interest
rate and changes in the probability that the bond issuer will be able to
make subsequent payments.
For a capital asset, uncertainty about the current period's demand
curve and uncertainty about the cost of inputs in the current period cause
income risk. Uncertainty about future demand and input prices, plus a
less than perfectly elastic capital supply curve, enable asset prices to
fluctuate and cause capital risk. Sumiers (l981a, 198lb) shows how the
assumption of rational expectations can be used to model the evolution
of asset prices in a situation where the adjustment of the capital stock
is costly. The size of fluctuations in asset prices is negatively related
to the elasticity of supply of capital goods. Alternatively, and more
simply, there may be uncertainty about the rate at which an asset depreciates
physically or becomes obsolete.
The distinction between income and capital risk is not of fundamental
economic significance, since it refers to forms rather than the size of real
economic returns. However, it is crucial to an analysis of a corporate income
tax like that in most countries which is levied on accounting measures of
income, rather than real economic income. Because accounting income excludes
capital gains and losses, the corporate income tax provides a much better
hedge against income risk than it does against capital risk. An extra dollar
in current income will yield something like an extra dollar in taxable profits.
Therefore, the government taxes a share equal to the tax rate in any15
unanticipated income gains or losses. This means that the government
takes an approximately equal share of risk and return so that the
preceding discussion of tax effects is applicable.
Capital risk is another matter. Capital gains and losses on capital
are excluded from the tax base, except in the very rare case where they
are realized through the sale of used assets. The only allowance made
for changes in the value of capital goods is through certain p_re—determined
depreciation deductions. Therefore, the corporate income tax does not
shield taxpayers from any of the capital risk on their assets.
It is tempting but unwise to think that the fact that taxes will be
levied on future corporate income reduces capital risk. The extent of
capital appreciation or depreciation depends on the percentage change in
the value of future rents. A proportional tax will reduce the variance
of absolute but not proportional changes in income.
RealIstic analysis of the corporate income tax must distinguish
then between the taxes levied on accounting income, and capital gains and
losses. This leads immediately to consideration of the difference between
allowing ex—post depreciation based on actual market valuations of
capital goods, and ex—ante depreciation based on the expected decline in
a capital good's market value. The former procedure would hedge taxpayers
against capital risk, while the latter does not.
Economic Depreciation
The issues involved in the distinction between income and capital risk
can be brought out most clearly by examining the polar case of a depreciating
asset that has only capital risk. The asset has an expected terminal value16
of 1—d times its original value. Holders of the asset require a risk
premium of ,soin a no—tax world equilibrium would require investment
to the point where
(2.1)f'(K)r ++ a
Note that we can use f'(K) rather than f(K)e: if an asset
has no income risk, its gross rentals for the current period can be
predicted exactly, even though its capital value (the present value
of future returns as of the end of the period) is uncertain.
In this no—tax setting investors are receiving certain gross
rental income equal to r + + citimes the initial value of the asset
plus a risky claim on the capital at the end of the period with an
expected value of 1—cS times the original value. The expected value
embodies a risk premium of a, however. If the investor went into the
futures market and agreed to sell his capital at a certain price at the
end of the period, he would only be able to negotiate a price of 1 —— a
times the initial value. Such a transaction would lock in the safe rate
of return of r.
With a tax, the value of economic depreciation deduction can be
calculated using similar analysis. Note that economic depreciation
deductions are just the capital losses on holding an asset. In the case
above, the firm has uncertain depreciation expected to amount to cS (the
asset is expected to decline in value to 1—6 times its initial value).
The firmwouldbe equally happy locking in a certain decline in
asset value of 6 + a, thereby passing the risk of ownership to the party17
it made a futures contract with. That is, the firm is equally happy
with certain depreciation deductions of a +6as with the uncertain
economic depreciation deductions which are expected to be 5. This
result mayseemparadoxical as it implies that the certainty equivalent
of the stream of depreciation tax shields is less than their expected
value. The paradox is resolved by noting that the depreciation tax
shield is a'hegative 8"asset. When the market does well, depreciation
is low, and conversely when the marekt does poorly, depreciation is
substantial.
Now, the effect of a corporate tax with ex post depreciation
deductions can be measured. The investor has a required certainty
equivalent rate of return, net of depreciation, of r. This return will
require
(2.2) f'—f-- + 6 +a
l—r
The actual expected after—tax rate of return is
(2.3) (f' —6)(1—i)—r+a(l—t)
while the certainty equivalent of the rents times 1—r (i.e., f'(l—r)) less the
certainty equivalent of the economic depreciation to be suffered times
l—T (i.e., (6+ci)(l—t)) equals r.
In equation (2.3) we see that the investor only requires a risk
premium of a(1—T) because with ex post depreciation the government has
taken on lOOt percent of the risk. Comparing (2.2) and (Z.l) we can see18
that because of this risk sharing, the marginal product of capital in
the corporate sector need rise by onlyr,which is a small amount
given the typically low values cited for r.
Expected tax revenues are quite large, however, equaling
r + cii; The certainty equivalent of those revenues is only j- r
with the remainder being compensation for taking on risk at the market
price. Therefore, only j.i—ris added in to the required marginal product
of corporate capital. This is Gordon's argument reviewed in the first
section of the paper. It shows that Gordonimplicitly assumes that
capital gains and losses are included in the corporate tax base.
However, corporate depreciation deductions do not vary with market
valuation of capital goods. Instead, firms receive depreciation deductions
according to a fixed depreciation schedule. Contrast the required pre—tax
marginal product of capital when investors receive certain depreciation
deductions equal to expected depreciation, with the required return when
economic depreciation is permitted. With fixed depreciation deductions,
the goverrment does not share in the risk associated with capital gaiis
and losses on asset holdings. Therefore, investors will require an after—
tax expected return that fully compensates them for all risk in holding
the asset.
The firm receives certain deductions equal to expected depreciation
of 5. The value of the tax shield produced by those deductions is Sr.
Given that the government is not sharing in the deviations of capital values
from the expected values, investors will require an after—tax return of
(2.4) f'(l—i) + r r ++ ci19
Solving for f' yields
(2.5)f' —f— +o+
Becausethe government taxes the risk premium by setting taxes
on expected economic income, but does not share in the risk, investors
require a higher pre—tax return (comparing (2.5) with (2.2)) even though
expected tax payments are the same. The difference is very substantial.
Notice that (2.5) implies that (f' —6)(l—T)=r+awhich exactly
parallels standard results in the certainty model.. Data on U.S. stock
and bond returns suggests that a =.06so that the use of ex—ante rather
than ex—post depreciation schedules has very substantial effects. The
difference in the required pre—tax rate of return in (2.2) and (2.5) is
1—T'whichequals the certainty equivalent increase in the tax liability
caused by using expected rather than economic depreciation.
III. Ex ante Economic Depreciation
Making Ex ante Depreciation as Favorable
as Ex post Depreciation
We have shown that given an asset with expected one period economic
depreciation of 6 plus a risk premium entirely attributable to capital risk
of a an investor would value uncertain ex post depreciation deductions with
an expected value of 6 as much as certain deductions of 6 + a. This result
can be extended to calculate the entire cx ante depreciation schedule which
is as favorable as ex post depreciation. We derive the result below for
an asset with exponential expected depreciation, with all capital risk,
and with a constant risk premium of a. Generalization to non—exponential
depreciation and fluctuating capital risk premia is transparent.20
For this analysis the fiction of the firm considering the
sale of its asset in the futures market is again instructive. Consider
an asset with an Initial value of 1, expected depreciation of 6, and
a required risk premium of a. Then the firm could lock in a sales price
for one period from now of 1 —6—a. Equivalently, it is equally happy
with certain depreciation of 6 + a or uncertain economic depreciation with
an expected value of 6.
Now consider what price could be received by agreeing to sell
the asset two periods from now. If the risk premium and expected depre-
ciation rate are constant, then the firm would be able to lock in a sales
price two periods from now of (1 —6—a)2.Equivalently, the firm is
equally happy taking economic depreciation in the second period or taking
certain depreciation of (1 —6—a)—(1—6— (a+6)(l—6—a).
The analysis could be continued to show that the certainty equivalent of
the risky depreciation deductions in period t is (cz+6)(1 —6—a)t.
To show that such certain depreciation is ex ante as favorable
as ex—post economic depreciation we verify that the requiredrate of return with
the proposed stream of certain deductions equals the required rate of
return with ex—post economic depreciation. In both cases we verifythat
for a break—even investment f' j— + 6 + a, as in (2.2).
For the proposed certain deductions the net present value of an extra
dollar invested in the asset, including risky cash flows and riskiess
depreciation allowances can be written as
(2.6)
ft(K)(1T)(16)tl+ (a+6)(la6)Tt—
t—l (1+ a + r) t1 (l+r)21
Equation (2.6) verifies that if .the marginal product of capital,
f'(K), equals ci + d +! the expected after—tax gross rents discounted
at the risky rate of a + r plus the certain depreciation tax shields
discounted at the riskless rate make the net present value of the investment
equal zero.
With ex—post economic depreciation, we have
(2.7) v= ft(K)(l5)t(lT) + tt(l_)t—
t1 (l+a(l—T) + r)t
In (2.7) the numerator is the firm's expected after—tax income in each
period while the denominator is the rate appropriate to discounting these
flows, given that the government has taken lOOt percent of the risk. As
in (2.6) the required rate of return, f'(K), pre—tax, to make the NPV equal
zero, is c + + .L_ —justas with the previously described certain deductions.
Ex ante Depreciation Rates as a
Measure of Economic Durability
Numerous conmientators on depreciation policy (e.g., Hulten and Wykoff
[1981]) suggest the expected decline in the market value of an asset as a
proxy for economic depreciation. Our work indicates that a better measure
would be the expected depreciation rate plus the portion of the risk premium
attributable to capital risk.(As indicated earlier, this is most of the
risk premium.)
Incorporating the capital risk premium in the definition of ex ante
depreciation leads to a more satisfactory measure of "economic durability."
For example, other things held equal, a greater proportion of the purchase
price of a very risky asset will be for near—term cash flows than for a
less risky asset. Therefore, one would naturally tend to think of the22
risky asset as economically less durable.
Similarly, a change in the riskiess interest rate effects
the value of a risky asset as though the risk premium were part of
the depreciation rate: A one percentage point Increase in r decreases
the present value of an exponentially depreciating constant risk
premium asset by r-i-°-ct percent —thatis, the "duration" of the
asset is
IV.Implicationsfor Tax Policy Analysis
The foregoing analysis suggests that any realistic description
of depreciation must recognize its stochastic character. In this section,
we show how the concepts developed above can be used to produce empirical
estimates of what ax ante tax depreciation schedule is required to
correspond to ex—post depreciation. Some crude estimates based on market
data of the overall rate of depreciation of the capital stock are then
presented. These are compared with standard BEA estimates. Finally,
the implications of our results for the measurement of effective tax rates,
and for analyses of the effects of taxation of the choice between assets
with differing durability are then considered.
We continue to rely on the approximation that all risk is capital
risk. In this case the previous discussion demonstrated that it is
appropriate to add the asset's risk premium to its expected rate of physical
depreciation in order to determine the appropriate rate of ex—ante
depreciation. This suggests one empirical method of deriving estimates of
appropriate depreciation schedules. If data on a time series of used asset
prices can be obtained, and if the assumptions of the capital asset pricing
model are accepted, the economic depreciation rate for an asset can be23
estimated as:
-
(4.1)d* + 8 (R —R) I ii m f
where Is the rate of ex—ante depreciation which is the certainty
equivalent of ex—post depreciation, 6 is the expected rate of depreciation,
8 is the asset's beta, R is the return on the market, and R is the i m f
riskiess rate.
Unfortunately, we are unaware of any data set extensive enough
to permit estimation of B for any type of used assets. Therefore, it is
difficult to use (4.1) as a basis for deriving estimates of economic
depreciation for paticular types of capital assets. However, it is possible
to use (4.1) to make an approximate estimate of the depreciation rate on
e the total capital stock. Estimates of prepared by the BEA for the
National Income and Product Accounts imply an average depreciation rate
of 10.5 percent for the non—financial corporate equipment and structures
in 1979. Hulten and Wykoff (1981) obtained lower estimates using
data on used asset prices. If it is assumed that the risk characteristics
of corporate capital are like those of unlevered equity, the second term
in (4.1) Is equal to about six percent. Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1979)
report that the risk premium on the stock market, —
Rfhas averaged
about nine percent over the last 50 years. The six percent figure is
obtained by assuming a debt—to—market value of equity ratio of one—half
as implied by statistics reported in Gordon and Malkiel (1981).
This calculation illustrates that taking account of risk has
important implications. These estimates suggest that it raises the appropriate24
average ex—ante rate of depreciation from 10 to 16 percent. Stated
differently, if double declining balance depreciation is assumed, our
risk adjustment reduces the appropriate average tax lives from 20 to
13 years.
There is an alternative way of calculating the appropriate ex—ante
depreciation rate on assets. Equation (1.1) implies that in the absence
of taxation investment will take place up to the point where
(4.2)
where is the price of capital goods. This suggests the appropriate
rate of ex—ante depreciation on an asset (5e+) can be estimated as:
(4.3)
That is, the appropriate rate of ex—ante depreciation for an asset is
given by the difference between its rental price ratio and the risk free
rate.11 The analysis is more complex in thepresence of taxation since
part of the value of a capital asset represents the present value of the
depreciation tax shields which it carries. We illustrate this below when
a generalization of (4.3) is used to calculate the depreciation rate on
the aggregate capital stock. Data on rental price ratios for different
capital assets are not readily available. Gordon (1979) estimates rental
price ratios of close to 25 percent implying depreciation rates of
approximately 22 percent on airplanes. This compares to the BEA rate of
7.5 percent and an estimate of 18.3 percent by Hulten and Wykoff (1981).25
A common rule of thumb in real estate is that properties sell for 100
months rent. This implies according to (4.3) a depreciation rate of
six percent assuming that cash expenses including property taxes plus
the riskiess interest rate add to six percent. The National Incoie
Accounts use a much smaller depreciation rate. These examples provide
further evidence that current measures of economic depreciation do not
provide a good guide to appropriate tax policy, if emulating the effects
of ex—post depreciation is the desideratum.
For the economy as a whole, we can make some calculations as to
the adequacy of depreciation deductions. We can write the market value
of the corporate sector as
(44)
where
MVt —marketvalue of corporate sector at time t
present value of after—tax cash flows if no future
depreciation were allowed
Btpresent value of depreciation tax shields (equals tax
rate times present value of depreciation deductions).
We also have
(4.5) R(l+r+cz) C + E(R1)
(4.6) E(R+i) R(l_e)
where
C after—tax cash flows produced in period t, less the
tax savings due to depreciation in the period.26
That is, (4.5) says that including the cash payout C and the
expected terminal value of the capital E(R+i), the investor must have
an expected return of r+ct. Equation (4.6) simply defines the expected
depreciation rate as
Combining (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6) yields
(4.7) e B
-r
wherejour measure of certainty equivalent economic depreciation.
Formula (4.7) allows us to use aggregate data to estimate what we call
ex—ante depreciation.
Table 2 shows the ex—post, ex—ante, and National Income Accounts
depreciation rates for the years 1950—79. The ex—post depreciation
rate is meant to measure the percentage decrease in the real market
value of corporate physical assets that were held at the beginning of
the year. The ex—post rate was calculated as gross investment in physical
assets by non—financial corporations, taken from the National Balance
Sheets, less the increase In the real market value of physical corporate
assets. For any given year, the market value of physical corporate assets
wastakenby adding the market value of NFC equity plus short—term and
long term debt, and subtracting financial assets. The market value of
short—term debt and the value of financial assets come from the National
Balance Sheets; the market value of long term debt is from Bulow and
Shoven (1981), who took the national balance sheet numbers and multiplied
by the ratio of market to book value of New York Stock Exchange bonds.
To calculate the increase in the real market value of physical assets in
yeart, the market value at the end of year t was reduced by the market27
value at the end of t—l, times one plus the inflation rate for year t
as measured by the GNP deflator. The ex—post depreciation rate,
reported in the table, was calculated as the depreciation number derived
above divided by the market value of physical assets at the end of the
prior year, times one plus the inflation rate.
Ex—ante physical depreciation was calculated using (4.7). It
is the after—tax cash flow less the value of depreciation tax shields for
a given year, C, divided by the market value of physical assets at the end
of the prior year, MV, (calculated above), less the present value of all
future depreciation deductions, B. C was calculated using data from the
Economic Report of the President, 1982. The formula used was corporate
profits plus capital consumption allowance with capital consumption adjustment,
plus net interest, minus corporate profits taxes, minus .48 times the
sum of NIA capital consumption allowance and the capital consumption
adjustment (the latter usually a negative number).
B was computed by taking B/pK from Summers (1981) and multiplying
by the sum of the current cost value of inventories plus property,
plant, and equipment from the National Balance Sheets. The ex—ante
C
depreciation rate was calculated as
B
less the riski.ess interest
rate, calculated by subtracting the inflation rate from the average three—
month Treasury bill rate.
Finally, NIA depreciation rates were calculated by dividing NIA
depreciation by the current cost value of all NFC tangible assets at the
end of the year, as reported in the National Balance Sheets.
In the table we present some data on depreciation attheaggregate
level. Since the estimates are derived from market data, they pertain
to all the assets of the corporate sector, not only those normally treated
as depreciable. These include land and inventories, which are normally1950
51
52
53
54
1955
56
57
58
59
1960
61
62
63
64
1965
66
67
68
69
1970
71
72
73
74
1975
76
77
78
79
1950—59
1960—69
1970—79
1950—79
28.
TABLE2
COMPARATIVEDEPRECIATION RATES
—0.5
11.1
7.5
18.7
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27.0
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—4.9
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31.9
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7.5
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treated as having a zero depreciation rate, and account for about a
third percent of non—financial corporate tangible assets based on infor—
tnation in the National Balance Sheets. This means that the NIA depreciation
figures we report are roughly a third percent lower than the composite
rate on equipment and structures.
Broadly, the results corroborate the calculations presented so
far. The mean ex—post depreciation rate is 7.5 which is quite close to
the standard estimates of the rate of depreciation. It is extremely
volatile ranging from 43.7 to —27.2.The mean ex—ante depreciation rate
is 13.0 reflecting its inicusion of the risk premium.
Including the recent Hulten and Wykoff (1981) used asset price
depreciation estimates we now have four alternative measures of depreciation.
The highest estimate is ex—ante depreciation of 13.0 percent. This number
is much higher than the ex—post rate of 7.5 percent. By contrast, both
the NIA and Hulten & Wykoff estimates are significantly lower than the
ex—post rate. The NIA rate is 6.3 percent, while Hulten & Wykoff are
roughly 20 percent below the NIA estimates for 1949—74.
The 5.5 percentage point differential between ex—ante and ex—post
depreciationis remarkably in line ith our prediction. Recall that with
a risk premium on the market of 9.0 percent and a debt/equity ratio in the
corporate sector ofwepredict a 6.0 percent differential. Of course
estimatesofthe market risk premium include datafrom 1950—79.Nevertheless,
itis of note that two alternative empirical methodologies of estimating
the difference between ex—anteandex—post depreciation give virtually
the same answer.
The most striking feature of the data is the increase in the ex—ante
rate of depreciation during the last decade. It averaged 7.8 between 1970
and 1974 and 15.4 between 1975 and 1979. This increase reflects the30
increased relative price uncertainty in the economy in three ways: first,
the increased risk may have led to increased expected returns and higher
risk premia. Second, increased relative price uncertainty increases the
expected decline in an asset's price because the investor is likely to
have made a more costly deviation from the expost optimal choice of
asset production techniques. Therefore, even if investors were risk
neutral they would require higher rental price ratios because of increased
expected economic depreciation. Third, the increased uncertainty about
relative prices could have led firms to invest in less durable assets——
particularly in the period right after the 1973—74 oil crisis when, with
new information coming in rapidly, firms were no doubt leery of committing
money to durable irreversible projects. For an excellent analysis and
discussion of these Issues see Bernanke (1982).
Using the approach developed here to examine the effective tax rate
on capital income in the U.S. is beyond the scope of this paper. The
data do appear to indicate that current depreciation allowances are much
less adequate than is usually assumed.
The importance of the effects considered here, and their implications
for the issue of neutrality can be examined by reconsidering standard
calculations of effective tax rates. Standard procedures include calculating
the expression:
eR-s
(4.8)r—-
where1e is the effective tax rate on a project, R. is its pre—tax internal
rate of return and s is its post—tax required internal rate of return.
Consider investing in a project which is all, equity financed, has a
marginal product of capital of f'(K), expected depreciation and a required31
return of r+a where a is the risk premium. Assume depreciation at rate
is permitted by pre—tax law. Equation (1.2) holds that equilibrium requires
that the condition (l—t)(f'(K)—)cz+r hold. This implies that the
standard calculation of an effective tax rate would yield
(4.9)
Now our analysis suggests that it would be more correct to use risk adjusted
rates of return in calculating effective tax rates. Reinterpreting R and s
as the risk adjusted rate of return yields:
a+r
el—t r(cz+r) (4.10) T ra+r ——a
1—i
As long as a >0the risk adjusted effective tax rate exceeds the
unadjusted rate. To see the importance of the risk adjustment, suppose
that a.06 and r —.02,and r —.5.Standard effective tax rate
calculations would yield 1e —.5while our procedure yields t .80.
Thus the use of misleading measures of economic depreciation can lead
to serious underestimates at the burden of capital income taxation.
Equation (4.10) also suggests that if tax depreciation is economic
in the conventional sense, the tax system will be biased against risky
(high ci) assets. These assets are likely to be ones which are long lived
since their greater durability causes their values to be more sensitive
to interest rate changes and new information. They are also likely to be
assets whose supply is relatively inelastic. Note also that if depreciation
allowances were allowed at exponential rate 5e4 e would equal r.32
Finally, observe that the understatement of depreciation will be
greatest for long lived assets. Land, for example, hasa(S <0.Our
work shows, however, that land should be depreciated. In general,
will be greatest for long lived assets. We believe that the risk effects
are sufficiently !inportant that calculations which ignore them such as
those presented in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) are likely to be very
misleading. In future work, we hope to use data on used asset prices and
rents to estimate appropriate ex—ante depreciation rates for different
assets.
V. Conclusions
This research echoes, for problems involving risk, the argument
of Summers (l98lb) that analyses of the effects of capital taxation must
recognize the importance of fluctuations in capital asset prices. We
argue that most of the risk borne by owners of corporate capital pertains
not to the current rentals which are hedged by the corporate income tax,
but to changes in the relative price of these assets which are not hedged
because the tax is levied on accounting income. This means that the tax
takes a much larger fraction of the return than it takes of the risk on
corporate investments.
We then analyze the role of tax depreciation recognizing that
there is substantial volatility in the rates at which capital assets lose
their value. The tax system as currently set up relies on ex—ante depreciation
allowances rather than actual ex—post measures of depreciation and so does
not share in the associated risk. We show that in a stochastic environment
the natural counterpart to economic depreciation involves allowing ex—ante33
depreciation at a rate faster than the expected decline in asset values.
More precisely if depreciation allowances are to compensate investors
for the risks they bear, the portion of the risk premium in the asset's
expectedreturn that is attributable to "capital risk" (asset price
fluctuation) must be added to expected depreciation.
Our empirical analysis reveals that this adjustment is of substantial
importance.Using two alternative methodologies both based on financial
market data we conclude that the appropriate rate of ex—ante depreciation
to allow in the U.S. non—financial corporate sector is approximately twice
that implied by data in the National Income Accounts. This suggests that
many previous analyses have significantly understated the burden of taxes
on corporate capital. It also suggests the need for further work in
order to assess possible non—neutralities between assets of different
durability and with different risk characteristics.
The research in this paper could be extended in a number of directions.
The current analysis has ignored considerations of personal income taxation
and corporate financial policy. We have not yet attempted an analysis
of optimal taxation in the presence of capital risk. Such an analysis
would need to recognize that the prices of inelastically supplied assets
are likely to be more volatile than the prices of more elastically supplied
assets. We hope to follow the valuable work of Hulten and Wykoff (1981)
in using data on used asset prices, in conjunction with rental price data
to derive depreciation rates on different types of assets.
Ouranalysisalso has implication for work on tax reform. The
scheme we propose of allowing ex—ante depreciation deductions at a rate
which compensates investors for the risks they bear is one of a number
of equivalent types of tax reform. Similar goals could be achieved by34
including cpaital gains and losses, asmeasured on the stock market,
in the corporate income tax. Alternatively, atax on the net worth
of the corporate sector could be employed. Inthe framework considered
here, these tax schemes would be verysimilar. In the context of richer
models there would be important differences which seemworthy of study.
The analysis here also has important implicationsfor research
on investment. The rate of ex—anteeconomic depreciation appears in
standard expressions for the cost of capital. Ourcalculations show
that rate increased substantially during the1970's. This suggests a
possible explanation for the sharp declinein net investment which has
been observed during the 1970's.35
Footnotes
Thanks to Ben Bernanke, Myron Scholes, and members of the NBER
taxation seminar for valuable comments.
1. These include the absence of transactions costs, limitations on short
selling, homogeneous expectations, the existence of a safe asset,
and competitive behavior.
2. If these assumptions are not satisfied, the government can increase
welfare by serving as a financial intermediary. However, i.E there
are economic reasons for the non—existence of markets, such as moral
hazard problems, there is no presumption that tax policy can increase
welfare.
3. Note that the gross marginal product of capital is f'(K) while the
net product is f'(K) —5.The depreciation assumption implies that
the value of a capital good declines by the factor (1—IS) each period.
4. This corresponds to standard concepts of economic depreciation in a
certainty setting.
5. This calculation assumes that the pre—tax gross marginal product of
capital is .20, and the aggregate production function of the corporate
sector is Cobb—Douglas with a capital share of .25. It is also assumed
that labor is supplied inelastically to the corporate sector.
6. This is because the government's claim can be costlessly replicated
by bargaining at the riskiess rate to buy equity. The argument is
the same as that presented above.
7. Similar conclusions can be obtained using the inflation—adjusted
earnings price ratios described in Summers (1981b).36
8. There is a remote possibility of a "peso" problem,wherethe market
risk premium reflects a low probability disaster which hasnotyet
taken place. Such a disaster would surely involve a change in the
relative price of capital goods, as discussed below.
9. The range reflects ambiguity in the allocation of the covariance
term, and the choice of concept. Note that since much of the
variation in earnings—price ratios, and marginal products of capital
is forecastable, these figures overstate the extent of income risk.
10. This conclusion needs to be modified slightly because of personal
taxation of capital gains. However, these taxes are levied at very
low effective rates because of the advantages of deferral and the
absence of constructive realization.
11. Note that if a — — Rf)this equation is equivalent to (4.1).*
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